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Abstract
A class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situa-
tions in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where
potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic
rules induced by the organization structure. These games form a cone
generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those based
on coalitions called peer groups. Different economic situations like
auctions, communication situations, sequencing situations and flow
situations are related to peer group games. For peer group games
classical solution concepts have nice properties.
JEL classification: C71.
Keywords: cooperative game, peer group game, graph–restricted
game, auction, sequencing, airport game.
1 Introduction
There are many economic situations where the social configuration of the or-
ganization influences the potential economic possibilities of all the groups of
agents. Several authors have used a game theoretical approach for analysing
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the consequences of this kind of constraints on economic cooperative be-
havior. They have separately considered the potential individual economic
possibilities as described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-
game) and the structure of the agent set induced by the social configuration
of the organization, and then modified the game accordingly. We mention
cooperative games with arbitrary communication structures (cf. Myerson
(1977, 1980), Owen (1986), Borm et al. (1994)) and games with permission
structures (cf. Gilles et al. (1992)).
In this paper we introduce a class of cooperative games naturally arising
from situations in which the set of agents is (strict) hierarchically structured
and where the potential individual economic possibilities interfere with the
behavioristical rules induced by the organization structure. We are thinking
of certain auctions, sequencing situations, flow situations and communication
situations of a special type. Every agent in a strict hierarchy has a relation-
ship with the leader either directly or indirectly with the help of one or more
other agents. The economic possibilities of an agent are restricted by his po-
sition in the hierarchy. The important group for an agent in such a situation
is that consisting of the leader, the agent himself and all the intermediate
agents that exist in the given hierarchy between the agent and the leader,
because only by this cooperation the agent’s potential economic possibilities
can become effective. We call such a group of agents a peer group. Our game
theoretical approach is based on peer groups of agents and on an integrative
view of the economic possibilities and the organization structure.
Recall that a TU-game is a pair < N, v >, where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a
finite set of players and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function, that assigns
to each coalition S ⊂ N the worth (reward) v(S), with v(∅) = 0.
The agents’ hierarchy is described by a rooted directed tree with the
leader located in the root and each other agent in a distinct node. This
tree uniquely determines the peer group structure: each agent’s peer group
corresponds to the agents in the unique path connecting the agent’s node
with the root in the tree.
Tree–connected peer group situations are introduced as triplets consist-
ing of the set of agents involved, the peer group structure describing the
organization’s social configuration and a real–valued vector that gives the
potential individual economic possibilities of the agents.
To each tree–connected peer group situation we associate a TU–game,
which we call a peer group game, with the agents as players and the characte-
ristic function defined for each coalition by pooling the individual economic
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possibilities of those members with the corresponding peer groups inside the
coalition. Thus, the peer groups are essentially the only coalitions that can
generate a non–zero payoff within a peer group game.
Our main result states that the family of peer group games forms a
cone generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those based
on coalitions called peer groups. With the use of this result we show that
the cone of peer group games lies in the intersection of the cones of convex
games and monotonic veto-rich games with the leader as veto-player. As a
result classical solution concepts for peer group games have nice properties.
We study solutions like: the core (cf. Gillies (1953)), the bargaining set (cf.
Aumann and Maschler (1964)), the kernel (cf. Davis and Maschler (1965)),
the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969), Kohlberg (1971)), the Weber set (cf.
Weber (1988)), the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)), the τ–value (cf. Tijs
(1981)), the selectope (cf. Hammer et al. (1977)). Special attention is paid
to the nucleolus of peer group games corresponding to line–graph connected
peer groups. We characterize the nucleolus of line–graph peer group games
as the unique solution of n equations.
The content of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we introduce our model, give the necessary definitions and prove our main
result. Some economic situations related to peer group games are described
in section 3. In section 4 properties and relations of solutions for peer group
games are discussed. Section 5 deals with the nucleolus of line–graph peer
group games.
2 Peer group situations and games
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of agents with social as well as individual
economic characteristics.
The social features are given by a strict hierarchy defining the agents’
relationships. Such a hierarchy can be described by a rooted directed tree1 T
with N = {1, 2, ..., n} as node set, agent 1 (the leader) as root, and each other
agent located in a node. Here is an example of such a tree representation
where five agents are involved.
1By a rooted directed tree we mean a directed graph with one distinguished node as








Chain–like hierarchies will be represented by line–graphs2 or chains.
The individual features are agents’ potential economic possibilities, de-
scribed by a vector a ∈ IRN+ , where ai is the gain which can be generated by
agent i if all his superiors cooperate with him.
We model the social constraints in economic behavior by means of T–
connected peer groups of agents.
Definition 2.1. For each agent i, i∈N , we call the peer group of agent i the
subset consisting of all the agents [1, i] in the path of T connecting 1 to i.
Example 2.1. The set of all the peer groups corresponding to the tree T in
Figure 2.1 is
[1, 1] = {1}, [1, 2] = {1, 2}, [1, 3] = {1, 2, 3},
[1, 4] = {1, 2, 4}, [1, 5] = {1, 2, 3, 5}.
Remark 2.1. It is the peer group of agent i that imposes social constraints
in agent i’s economic behavior. Agent i can only become ”effective” if he is
in cooperation with all the other members of his peer group.
Definition 2.2. A peer group structure on N induced by T is a mapping P
which associates to each agent i in N the peer group of agent i
P : N −→ 2N , where P (i) = [1, i].




i means that j lies on the
path from the root 1 to i.
2By a line–graph or chain we mean a tree whose nodes are located on a single path.
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Definition 2.3. A T–connected peer group situation is a triplet < N,P, a >,
where N is the set of agents involved, P is the peer group structure on N
induced by T , and a ∈ IRN+ is the vector describing the individual potential
economic possibilities.
To each T–connected peer group situation (pg-situation) we associate a
TU cooperative game called in the following peer group game (pg–game).
Definition 2.4. Given a T–connected peer group situation < N,P, a > we
call the corresponding peer group game the TU–game < N, vP,a >, or shortly




ai, ∀S ⊂ N ; v(∅) = 0.
Example 2.2. Let < N,P, a > be the T–connected peer group situation
with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, P the peer group structure on N induced by the tree
T in Figure 2.1, and a ∈ IRN+ . Then the corresponding peer group game is
given by
v({1}) = v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = v({1, 5}) = v({1, 3, 4}) =
= v({1, 3, 5}) = v({1, 4, 5}) = v({1, 3, 4, 5}) = a1;
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 2, 5}) = a1 + a2;
v({1, 2, 3}) = a1 + a2 + a3;
v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 2, 4, 5}) = a1 + a2 + a4;
v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = a1 + a2 + a3 + a4;
v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = a1 + a2 + a3 + a5;
v(N) = a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 + a5; v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Remark 2.3. If 1 /∈ S then v(S) = 0.
The peer groups are essentially the only payoff generating coalitions
within a peer group game. Each peer group game can be expressed as a
nonnegative combination of the unanimity games corresponding to the peer
groups.
Let u[1,i] be the unanimity game corresponding to the peer group [1, i]






So, in fact, ai is the Harsanyi dividend of the peer group [1, i].
Let α, β≥0, a, b∈IRN+ , and let <N,P, a>, <N, P, b>, <N, P, αa+βb>
be peer group situations corresponding to the hierarchy T described by P .
Then for the corresponding peer group games vP,a, vP,b, vP,αa+βb we have
vP,αa+βb = αvP,a + βvP,b.
So, peer group games form a cone {< N, vP,a >| a ∈ IR
N
+}, which is generated
by the independent subset {u[1,i] | i ∈ N} of unanimity games corresponding
to peer groups.
Note that from (2.1) it follows that the cone of peer group games is a
subcone in the cone of convex games because unanimity games are convex
(Shapley (1971)) and peer group games are nonnegative combinations of
convex games.
Note also that from (2.1) it follows that peer group games are monotonic
and that agent 1 (the leader) is a veto player. So, the cone of peer group
games is also a subcone in the cone of monotonic games with 1 as veto player.
Peer group games are also superadditive. Then w = v − a1u[1,1] is zero–
normalized and superadditive. We study its relation with T–component ad-
ditive games3.
Recall that according to Potters and Reijnierse (1995) a game < N, v >
is called a T–component additive game if < N, v > is a superadditive zero–





where S/T is the set of connected components of S in T . For each i ∈ N\{1},






1, [1, i] ⊂ S
0, otherwise.








3T–component additive games are introduced in Potters and Reijnierse (1995) as Γ–
component additive games.
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This means that v−a1u[1,1] is an element in the cone of T–component additive
games with N \ {1} as player set.
So, we proved the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1.
(i) The peer group games corresponding to the T–connected peer group
situations < N,P, a > with N,P fixed and a ∈ IRN+ form a cone
PGG(N,P );
(ii) The cone PGG(N,P ) is in the intersection of the cones of convex games
and monotonic veto rich games with 1 as veto player;
(iii) For each peer group game v, the zero–normalization v − a1u[1,1] is an
element in the cone of T–component additive games.
Remark 2.4. In relation with Theorem 2.1 the following question could
arise: is each game v in the intersection of convex games and monotonic veto–
rich games with 1 as veto player and satisfying the condition v− v({1})u[1,1]
in the cone of T–component additive game a peer group game? The answer






v = 5u{1,2} + 7u{1,3} + 10u{1,2,3}.
Note that v is a convex game, a T–component additive game, and also a
monotonic game with 1 as veto player, but it is not a peer group game
because {1, 2, 3} is not a peer group.
7
3 Economic situations related to peer group
situations
In this section auction situations, communication situations and sequencing
situations are considered, leading to pg–situations and pg-games. To a peer
group situation one can also assign a max flow situation such that the cor-
responding peer group game and flow game coincide. Further a formal ma-
thematical relation between airport problems and peer group situations is
discussed.
3.1 Auction situations and peer group situations
Let us concentrate in this subsection on sealed bid second price auction
situations (cf. Rasmusen (1989), chapter 11). In such a situation there is a
seller of an object who has a reservation price, say r, which is the lowest price
for which he wants to sell the object and which is known to the potential
bidders. We suppose that there are n bidders (players) 1, 2, ..., n, each of them
submitting one bid b1, b2, ..., bn in an envelope. After opening the envelopes,
the bidder with the highest bid obtains the object at the price of the second
highest bid.
Let wi be the value for player i of the object, which is not necessarily
known by the other players. Suppose
(3.1) w1 > w2 > w3 > · · · > wn ≥ r.
Note that if player i acts alone, it is optimal for him (a dominant strategy)
to bid his own value, so bi = wi. This leads to a payoff v({i}) = 0 if i 6= 1
and to a payoff v({1}) = w1 − w2 for player 1, because player 1 obtains the
object for a price w2. If all players in N = {1, 2, ..., n} decide to cooperate,
a dominant strategy is that player 1 bids b1 = w1 and the others r, so bi = r
if i ∈ N \ {1}. Then the object goes to player 1 at price r and the payoff to
N is v(N) = w1 − r. If a coalition S 6= N works together (secretly or not),
they detect which player in S has the highest value. If this is player i(S),
then he bids wi(S) and the others bid r. This is a dominant bidding strategy
for S. Supposing that the other players (or groups) in N \ S play also their
dominant bidding strategy we can consider two cases.
Case 1. Player 1 is not in S, so i(S) 6= 1. Then the object goes to
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player 1 (or the group to which 1 belongs) in N \ S. The value v(S) of S is
in this case 0.
Case 2. Player 1 is in S. Then the highest bid is w1 and the second
highest bid wk+1 if [1, k] ⊂ S and k + 1 /∈ S. (Remember that bi = r for
i = 2, ..., k). In this case the value of the coalition S is v(S) = w1 − wk+1,
because player 1 obtains the object at price wk+1. For the coalitional game
< N, v > corresponding to this auction situation we have
Proposition 3.1. < N, v > coincides with the peer group game correspon-
ding to the T -connected peer group situation < N,P, a > where
N = {1, 2, ..., n}, T is the line–graph with root 1 and with arcs (1, 2), (2, 3), ...,
(n− 1, n) and where ai = wi − wi+1 for i ∈ N with wn+1 = r.
Proof. Let < N, v′ > be the peer group game, corresponding to the peer
group situation described in the theorem. Then v′ =
n∑
i=1
(wi − wi+1)u[1,i]. So
v′(S) = 0 if 1 /∈ S and v′(S) =
k∑
i=1
(wi − wi+1) = w1 − wk+1 if [1, k] ⊂ S and
k + 1 /∈ S. Hence, v = v′.
Example 3.1. Suppose that in a sealed bid second price auction there are
three bidders with values for the object of 100, 80, 50, respectively, and
suppose that the reservation price is 25. Then the corresponding pg–game
equals 20u{1}+30u{1,2}+25u{1,2,3}. If all bidders work together, bidder 1 bids
100, bidders 2 and 3 bid 25, so the object goes to player 1 who pays 25.
Remark 3.1. Consider a first price sealed bid auction for which the values
w1, w2, ..., wn and the reservation price r (denoted also by wn+1) are common
knowledge among the bidding agents and where also (3.1) holds. Suppose
the minimal increment is ε and ε < wi − wi+1 for all i ∈ N . Then it is
optimal for player i to submit a bid w′i+1 := wi+1 + ε. For a subgroup S with
[1, i] ⊂ S and i + 1 /∈ S it is ’optimal’ that player 1 bids wi+1 + ε and the
other players in S bid r. The corresponding cooperative game < N, v > is a










3.2 Graph–restricted binary communication situations
Let < N,P, a > be as before a T -connected peer group situation. Consider
situations where gains are made via binary interactions (communications)
of a central agent 1 with each of the other agents i ∈ N , resulting in a
gain ai, but where communication restrictions hold, described by the tree T .
One can think of binary interactions of different kind such as information
exchange between 1 and i, or import (export) of goods via harbour 1 for
agent i, or approval by 1 of a planned action of player i. If there were no
communication restrictions, the corresponding game < N,w > should be
given by w =
n∑
i=1
aiu{1,i}. With the communication restriction given by the
tree T , we obtain the graph–restricted game (cf. Myerson (1977)) v = w|T ,




< N,P, a >.
3.3 Sequencing situations
Recall that a sequencing situation (cf. Curiel et al. (1989)) is a triplet
(σ0, p, α), where σ0 is the initial order, p = (pi)i∈N with pi > 0 is the pro-
cessing time of customer i, and α = (αi)i∈N , where αi is the cost per unit
of time for i. The urgency index of i is given by ui = p
−1
i αi. It is well
known (cf. Smith (1956)) that it is optimal to serve the agents according to
their urgency, the most urgent first etc., and this order can be obtained by
neighbour switches. The corresponding cost savings game is a nonnegative




gk,`u[k,`], where gk,`=(pkα`−p`αk)+, i.e. gk,`= max{0, pkα`−p`αk}.
Some sequencing situations also lead to peer group games. We are thinking
of special sequencing situations in which the initial order σ0 = (1, 2, ..., n) of
n customers is such that the following relation between urgency indices holds
(3.2) u2 > u3 > · · · > un.
In the case that (3.2) holds, the optimal order is obtained only by neigh-
bour switches between 1 and some other customers; this means that all gk,`
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with k 6= 1 are zero. So, the considered sequencing situations lead to peer




g1,iu[1,i], where g1,i = (p1αi − piα1)+.
Such a peer group game corresponds to a T–connected peer group situation
< N,P, a >, where T is the line–graph with arcs (1, 2), (2, 3), ..., (n − 1, n),
corresponding to the initial order in the sequencing situation, and where
ai = g1,i for each i ∈ N \ {1} and a1 = 0.
3.4 Flow situations
Peer group games can also arise from flow situations. Let us consider the
tree T from Figure 2.1 that generates the peer group game given in Example
2.2, and construct the corresponding flow situation. We have to add two
special nodes called the source and the sink and the following arcs: the arc
connecting the source with agent 1 with infinite capacity, and for each i ∈ N
the arc with capacity ai connecting agent i with the sink. The following flow


































































The corresponding flow game (cf. Kalai and Zemel (1982)) coincides with
the peer group game.
3.5 Airport games and peer group games
Landing fee problems for planes of different types have generated an interes-
ting class of cooperative games, namely airport games (cf. Littlechild and
Owen (1977)). Suppose planes of players 1, 2, ..., n need landing strips of
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length `1, `2, ..., `n with `1>`2>· · ·>`n and related costs c1>c2>· · ·>cn. The
corresponding airport game < N, c > is given by
c = cnu
∗
N + (cn−1 − cn)u
∗
N\{n} + · · ·+ (c1 − c2)u
∗
{1},
where < N, u∗S > is a game with u
∗
S(T ) = 1 if S∩T 6= ∅ and u
∗
S(T ) = 0 other-
wise. The Shapley value of this game gives an interesting and appealing way
to solve the landing fee problems. The dual game < N, c∗ > corresponding
to < N, c > is given by c∗(S) = c(N)− c(N \ S) for each S ⊂ N . Note that
c∗ = cnuN +
n−1∑
i=1
(ci − ci+1)u{1,2,...,i}, which is clearly a peer group game. We
did not yet exploit the duality relation between airport games and line–graph
peer group games.
4 Solutions for peer group games
By Theorem 2.1 (ii), peer group games are convex games and veto rich games.
This fact implies many nice properties and relations for solutions.
Convex games were introduced in Shapley [1971] where it is proved that
they have nonempty cores and the ”regular” structure of the core is stu-
died. Additional nice properties for solutions of convex games are proved in
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972), Driessen (1988), Curiel (1997). Thus
it is shown that for convex games some solution concepts (the bargaining
set, the Weber set) coincide with the core, and other solutions (the Shapley
value, the kernel, the nucleolus) occupy central positions in the core.
Monotonic veto–rich games were introduced by Arin and Feltkamp (1997)
where special properties for the kernel and nucleolus are proved, and an ef-
ficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus is given.
Peer group games are also positive games, i.e. nonnegative combinations
of unanimity games (see (2.1)); other results concerning solutions follow.
Theorem 4.1. For peer group games the following properties of solution
concepts4 hold:
(i) The bargaining set M(v) coincides with the core C(v);
(ii) The kernel K(v) coincides with the pre–kernel K∗(v) and the pre-kernel
consists of a unique point which is the nucleolus of the game;
4We refer to solutions for the grand coalition.
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(iii) The nucleolus Nu(v) occupies a central position in the core and is the
unique point satisfying
Nu(v) = {x ∈ C(v) | sij(x) = sji(x), ∀i, j}, where
sij(x) = max{v(S)− x(S) | i ∈ S ⊂ N \ {j}};
(iv) The core C(v) coincides with the Weber set W (v), that is
C(v) = conv{mσ(v) | σ is a permutation of the players} and mσ(v)
is the marginal vector w.r.t. σ;
(v) The Shapley value Φ(v) is the center of gravity of the extreme points of






, i ∈ N,
where P (j) is the peer group of player j and |P (j)| means the number
of elements in P (j);
(vi) The τ -value is given by








(vii) The core C(v) coincides with the selectope S(v) of the game, where
S(v) := conv{mβ(v) ∈ IRN |β : 2N \ {∅} → N with β(S) ∈ S}, where
mβ(v) is the selector value corresponding to β;
(viii) There exist population monotonic allocation schemes (pmas).
Proof. (i), (ii) and (iii) follow from convexity and are shown in Maschler,
Peleg and Shapley (1972) and Maschler (1984).
(iv) is proved in Driessen (1988) and Curiel (1997).
(v) From convexity it follows that the Shapley value is in the barycenter
of the core. According to the definition of the Shapley value (cf. Shapley
(1953)) the players in each peer group split equally the Harsanyi dividend of
their peer group. The expression for Φ(v) results then from (2.1).
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(vi) The τ -value for peer group games can easily been calculated, because
convexity implies semiconvexity (cf. Driessen (1988)), so
τi(v) = αv({i}) + (1− α)(v(N)− v(N \ {i})), i ∈ N,
where α is such that efficiency holds.
The expression for Mi(v) = v(N) − v(N \ {i}) follows from (2.1) and
linearity.
(vii) From (2.1) it follows that peer group games are positive games,
so according to Theorem 2 in Derks et al. (2000) the core and selectope
coincide. The selectope consists of all possible reasonable ways to distribute
the dividends of peer groups among the players.
(viii) is also a consequence of convexity. Sprumont (1990) shows that
each element of the core of a convex game is extendable to a pmas.
5 The nucleolus for line–graph peer group
games
The purpose of this section is to prove that the nucleolus of a pg-game corres-
ponding to a line–graph is the unique solution of n equations. We exploit the
fact that the nucleolus is a core element and that it is (the unique element)
in the prekernel.
In the following lemma and theorem < N, v > is the pg-game corres-
ponding to < N,P, a > where P = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, ..., {1, 2, ..., n}},
a ∈ IRn+, and z is the nucleolus of < N, v > .
Lemma 5.1. For each i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} the nucleolus satisfies the equation







Proof. Since z is a core element we have
(5.1) z1 ≥ a1 ≥ 0, zk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {2, ..., n};
(5.2) z(T ) ≥ v(T ) for all T ∈ 2N .
Since z is a prekernel element we have
(5.3) si,i+1(z) = si+1,i(z) for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}.
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In view of (5.3) it is sufficient to prove for i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
(5.4) si+1,i(z) = −zi+1,
(5.5) si,i+1(z) = max{−zi, Ai − Zi}.
To prove (5.4), take a coalition S with i + 1 ∈ S and i /∈ S. Let U be the
largest peer group in S if there is one; otherwise, let U = ∅. Then
e(S, z) = v(S)− z(S) = v(U)− z(S) ≤
≤ v(U)− z(U)− zi+1 ≤ −zi+1 = e({i+ 1}, z),
where the first inequality follows from (5.1) and the second from (5.2) with
U in the role of T . So,
si+1,i(z) = max{e(S, z) | i /∈ S, i+ 1 ∈ S} = e({i+ 1}, z) = −zi+1.
To prove (5.5), take a coalition S with i ∈ S, i+1 /∈ S. Then S = S1∪{i}∪S2,
where S1 = S ∩ [1, i− 1] and S2 = S ∩ {i+ 2, ..., n}. For i = 1 we interpret
[1, i− 1] as the empty set ∅ and [i+ 2, n] = ∅ if i = n − 1 or i = n.
Let T1 be the largest peer group in S1, if there are peer groups in S1;
otherwise, let T1 = ∅.
We consider two cases: T1 = [1, i− 1], T1 6= [1, i− 1]. Note that for i = 1
we have only the first case.
Case 1. Let T1 = [1, i− 1]. Then
e(S, z) = v(S)− z(S) = v([1, i])− z(S) ≤ v([1, i])−
i∑
k=1
zk = e([1, i], z),
where the inequality follows from (5.1).
For i=1 one obtains s1,2(z)= max{e(S, z)|1∈S, 2/∈S}=e([1, 1], z)
= v({1})− z1 = a1 − z1 = max{−z1, a1 − z1}. So, (5.5) holds for i = 1.
Case 2. Let T1 be a proper subset of [1, i− 1], where i > 1. Then
e(S, z) = v(S)− z(S) = v(T1)− z(S) ≤ v(T1)− z(T1)− zi ≤ −zi = e({i}, z),
where the inequalities follow from (5.1) and (5.2), respectively.
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Hence, for i ≥ 2 we have
si,i+1(z) = max{v(S)− z(S) | i ∈ S, i+ 1 /∈ S} =
= max{e([1, i], z), e({i}, z)}= max{Ai − Zi,−zi}.
Theorem 5.1. The nucleolus z of < N, v > is the unique solution of the n
equations
Zn = An, zi = min{zi−1, Zi−1 − Ai−1}, i = 2, ..., n.
Proof. Let M = {x∈IRn|xi+1= min{xi, Xi−Ai}, for each i∈{1, 2, ..., n−1}}.
Note that for x ∈ M , the first coordinate uniquely determinates the other
coordinates x2, x3, ..., xn, i.e. x1 determines x2, then x3 is uniquely deter-
mined by x1 and x2, and so on. Note also that for x, x′ ∈M , if x1 > x′1, then
xk > x
′






x′i. This implies that there is
at most one element in M with the sum of the coordinates equal to An. On
the other hand, in view of Lemma 5.1 the nucleolus z is an element in M ,
and Zn = An because z is a core element, so the efficiency condition holds.
Hence {z} = {x ∈M | Xn = Zn}, which proves the theorem.
Remark 5.1. The result of Theorem 5.1 is used in Brânzei et al. (2000) to
design an iterative algorithm in order to approximate the nucleolus.
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